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Abstract
A major motivation of proof-planning is to bridge the gap between high-level, co-
gnitively adequate reasoning for specic domains, and calculus-level reasoning to
ensure soundness. For high reasoning levels the cognitive adequacy of representa-
tion and reasoning techniques is a major issue, while for lower reasoning levels the
adequacy wrt. the modelled domain is important. Furthermore, proof construction
is an engineering task and there is a need to support the design and application
of proof-search engineering methods. To this end we present a framework to expli-
citly support dierent reasoning levels. To structure reasoning levels the framework
allows for an explicit representation of abstractions and proof-search renement
techniques. In order to ensure soundness within a reasoning level, we use techni-
ques developed in the context of matrix characterisation relying on the notion of
indexed formulas. Furthermore, we introduce a uniform concept for contextual rea-
soning, and sketch basic tacticals for the denition of tactics to organise the overall
proof-search inside and across dierent reasoning levels.
Keywords: Proof-planning, Methodology, Abstraction, Matrix Characterisations
1 Introduction
A major motivation for proof-planning is to allow on the one hand for a
high-level reasoning which is (cognitively) adequate for specic problems and
domains. On the other hand the nal product of the reasoning process must
be a calculus level proof wrt. some logic, in order to have a veriably sound
proof. Besides the cognitive motivation, another reason for the dierent re-
asoning levels is that the construction of a proof for some theorem is an en-
gineering task. Analogously to the development of software, where one starts
with a high-level specication of a program that is subsequently rened to
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an executable program in some target programming language, we view proof-
planning as a methodology to design (and subsequently apply) dierent re-
asoning levels as well as methods to stepwise rene proof specications (i.e.
proof plans). Hence, proof-planning has been introduced as a methodology to
rene high-level proof-plans of a theorem to a calculus level.
The objectives of the dierent reasoning levels are dierent: for high rea-
soning levels, the adequacy of the representation and the reasoning techniques
is a key issue, in order to allow for an intuitive reasoning, which is as close
as possible to say the style of a human. Although the reasoning inside one
reasoning level should be sound, there is another notion of relative soundness
due to the presence of dierent reasoning levels. A high reasoning level is
relatively sound wrt. some lower reasoning level, if any high level proof can
be rened to some low level proof. Usually, this relative soundness does not
hold, which is a well-known eect in the presence of abstractions [5]. We do
not want to enforce the relative soundness of high reasoning levels, as this
usually may hamper the adequacy of representations, whereas the primary
purpose of those levels is to allow for an eÆcient and adequate search for a
proof plan. The relative soundness of a proof on a high reasoning level is
established by stepwise renement of this proof to a calculus level proof. On
the lower reasoning levels we are less concerned with the cognitive adequacy
of representations, but rather with the adequacy wrt. the modelled domain,
as for example some program behaviour or a mathematical domain.
In this paper we present a proof-planning framework that supports the
design and application of proof search engineering methods. First, we dene
in Sect. 2 the notion of a reasoning level, which consists of reasoning objects
(e.g formulas, sequents, etc.) and reasoning procedures (e.g. tactics, plan-
ning algorithms, general theorem proving algorithms, etc.). For example, in
a proof-planner like [10,2], the reasoning objects are sequents as well as the
pre- and postconditions of some methods, which are used as inference rules.
The reasoning procedure of a proof-planner is the depth-rst search algorithm
applying the methods. To ensure the soundness wrt. some logic within a reaso-
ning level, a variety of logics are predened in the framework, and a uniform
mechanism to encode those logics is introduced. For sake of representatio-
nal adequacy, the logics are not embedded in some meta-logic. Instead we
present in Sect. 4 techniques developed in the context of matrix characteri-
sation [12,9] that rely on the notion of indexed formulas. Those allow for a
uniform treatment of a large class of classical, modal and intuitionistic logics,
without having to change the syntax of the formulas.
Secondly, we dene in Sect. 3 vertical structuring mechanisms to relate
dierent reasoning levels. This includes on the one hand the explicit denition
of abstractions, which dene how reasoning objects of a higher reasoning level
are related to those of a lower level. On the other hand, we introduce the
notion of renements, which determine how higher-level reasoning procedure
can be implemented by some lower-level reasoning procedures. This subsumes
2
Autexier
e.g. the notion of renement encoded in a method of a proof-planner like [10,2],
where the tactic wrapped inside a method determines the renement of the
abstract rule described by the pre- and postcondition of the method. Based
on the general notion of renement, the renement of an abstract proof can
be dened in a uniform manner.
Thirdly, reasoning procedures should be denable in an intuitive manner,
again because of the overall motivation of cognitive adequacy. To this end we
present in Sect. 5 window inference reasoning, which is a formalisation of an
intuitive reasoning style, that allows to focus the reasoning on sub-formulas
and sub-terms, and aims at contextual reasoning. We integrate window in-
ference reasoning with the indexed formulas from Sect. 4 and present as a
by-product how this allows for contextual reasoning in a canonical way.
Finally, we present in Sect. 6 the basic programming language to dene
reasoning and renement procedures and how to combine those in order to
organise the overall proof search. These build upon the intuitive reasoning
rules provided by window inference reasoning and have an explicit failure and
success semantics.
2 Reasoning Levels
In this section we introduce the notion of reasoning levels. Those are the
horizontal structures of the framework in opposition to the abstraction and
renement techniques (cf. Sect. 3) that are the vertical structures.
A reasoning level consists on the one hand of the objects we want to reason
about as well as the basic reasoning rules, and on the other hand of the
reasoning procedures organising the proof search within one reasoning level.
The former are dened by a signature and a set of formulas wrt. some logic.
Thus, the reasoning objects and rules of a reasoning level are given by a pair
(;), where  is the signature and  is a set of \axioms", and we denote
such a pair as a representation. This is similar to the notion of a specication
in formal specication languages [8], which are e.g. used to dene abstract
datatypes and functions about abstract datatypes. For a reasoning level, the
signature  determines the syntax of the reasoning objects and the available
basic reasoning rules are determined by the \axioms" from .
Example 2.1 As an example we present a representation called TLA for TLA
formulas [7] and a representation TLA-States&Transitions for the abstrac-
tion of TLA formulas. The signature for TLA contains the usual logical connec-
tives, as well as 2;3, and also WF to express fairness requirements. As an
example we use a simple program, which has a counter x of initial value 15
and that decreases this counter in every step if it is greater than 0. This is
encoded in TLA by the following formula
x = 15 ^2(x  0 ^ x
0
= x  1) ^WF(x  0 ^ x
0
= x  1)
x
In order to prove that the counter eventually has the value 0 (encoded by
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3x = 0), we use as abstraction a representation consisting of states and
state transitions. This representation is called TLA-States&Transitions and
consists of states hni representing the state, where x has the value n, and state
transitions represented by 8n : hni ) hn   1i. This is an abstraction of the
transition made by the program, i.e. x  0^ x
0
= x  1. Finding a proof-plan
for 3x = 0, consists in nding a proof for h0i on the (abstract) representation
TLA-States&Transitions. 2
The second component of a reasoning level are the reasoning procedures,
which organise the proof search within the reasoning level. We adopt a ge-
neral notion for a reasoning procedure, by dening it to be an algorithm in
some programming language, which interacts with the proof by applying ba-
sic inference rules. Additionally a reasoning procedure comes with a notion
of success and failure to reect about its own behaviour. E.g. in case of
failure a reasoning procedure might invoke backtracking to some previous
proof state. This notion of a reasoning procedure is general enough to sub-
sume various kinds of specic reasoning procedures developed in automated
theorem proving, like, e.g., a tactic in a tactical theorem prover, the various
algorithms in an automated theorem prover, or a proof-planning algorithm in
some proof-planner.
In summary, we have dened a reasoning level to consist of two parts,
namely representations dening the syntax of the reasoning objects and rea-
soning procedures to organise the proof-search inside the reasoning level. This
can be sketched by the following equation:
Reasoning level = Representation + Reasoning procedures
The next step consists in relating reasoning levels. To this end vertical
structures are introduced in the next section, that describe the mechanisms to
switch between reasoning levels.
3 Structuring Reasoning Levels
In this section we dene the mechanisms to structure the dierent reasoning
levels of the framework (cf. Fig. 1). There are two dual notions of vertical
structures: rst, abstractions can be dened which describe how objects of a
higher reasoning level can be constructed from objects of a lower reasoning
levels. Formally, an abstraction is a mapping of a set of objects of a source
representation R
S
to a set of objects of some target representation R
T
. For the
purpose of the framework, we dene an abstraction to consist of a name, the
source and target representations R
S
and R
T
, and an abstraction procedure
(i.e. an algorithm) to compute the mapping.
Example 3.1 Consider as an example the source representation NAT of na-
tural numbers and labelled fragments (LF-NAT) as respective target represen-
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Reasoning Level 3 = Representation-3 + Reasoning Procedures 3
Reasoning Level 2 = Representation-2 + Reasoning Procedures 2
Reasoning Level 1 = Representation-1 + Reasoning Procedures 1
Abstraction
Abstraction
Renement
Renement
Fig. 1. Structuring reasoning levels
tation. Labelled fragments are known abstractions in the context of inductive
theorem proving, where they are used to abstract over the specic dierences
(so-called wave-fronts) between two terms sharing a common skeleton. The
representation NAT consists of a signature for natural numbers and { among
others { of two axioms dening the addition of natural numbers
8y 0 + y= y(1)
8x; y s(x) + y= s(x+ y)(2)
The representation LF-NAT consists on the one hand of a signature extending
the signature of NAT by a function  : Nat! Nat that is used to represent the
wave-fronts, and on the other hand of the axioms
8y  (y)= y(3)
8x; y  (x) + y= (x + y)(4)
8x  (s(x))= s((x))(5)
The labelled-fragment abstraction is an abstraction from NAT to LF-NAT and
its associated abstraction procedure maps the singleton f(1)g to the singleton
f(3)g, and the singleton f(2)g to the set f(4); (5)g. 2
Thus, an abstraction consists of the source and target representations and
a function mapping objects from the source representation to objects of the
target representation. This can be expressed in an intuitive manner by the
following equation:
Abstraction = Source & Target Representations + Abstraction procedure
The dual vertical structuring mechanism is the renement of higher-level
reasoning procedures to lower-level reasoning procedures. Take as an example
of a high-level reasoning procedure some planning algorithm, which computes
a proof-plan from methods. This proof-plan is a \proof" on the reasoning
level of the proof-planning procedure, and consists of the application of basic
rewriting rules dened by the pre- and postconditions of the methods. We
can associate to this planning procedure a renement procedure, which takes
generated proof-plan and renes it by calling the tactics wrapped inside the
dierent methods. In this scenario the renement information is associated
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to each basic reasoning rule of the higher reasoning level via the methods.
A method describes that an abstract proof step satisfying a certain pattern
(described by the pre- and postcondition of the method) could be rened by
the tactic wrapped inside the method. The renement procedure exploits this
knowledge in order to rene a proof plan. In general it is not possible to
describe this renement information by patterns. In order to deal with the
general case, we allow to associate a renement procedure to some reasoning
procedure. Such a renement procedure takes the proof generated by the re-
asoning procedure as a proof-plan to compute a proof on the lower reasoning
level (using the lower-level reasoning procedures). Similarly to reasoning pro-
cedures, renement procedures come with an explicit success and failure
semantics to reect about their own behaviour. This allows for example to
backtrack the renement process and to try alternative renements.
>From the above we can summarise the notion of renement by stating
that a renement is composed of a reasoning procedure and an associated
renement procedure. This can be sketched by the following equation:
Renement = Reasoning procedure + Renement procedure
Note that a renement procedure for some reasoning procedure P can
dually be interpreted as some kind of abstraction, where all the (lower-level)
reasoning procedures used by the renement procedure are abstracted to the
reasoning procedure P. This notion of abstraction is dierent from the notion
presented above, since it is an abstraction of reasoning procedures while the
former is an abstraction of objects and axioms. Furthermore do renement
procedures exploit knowledge about object abstractions during the renement.
Hence, an object abstraction also gives rise to some notion of renement.
The reason why we introduced abstractions mainly for objects and renement
mainly for reasoning procedures is because this is the usual way those are
used.
4 Handling Soundness
In this section we dene a uniform mechanism to handle soundness for a
variety of logics. For sake of the adequacy of representation, we want to
support directly the soundness wrt. some logic without altering the syntax of
formulas. Subsequently, we do not want to embed a logic in some meta-logic,
like e.g. intuitionistic higher-order logic. In comparison to the representations
introduced in Sect. 2, a logic also denes the syntax of reasoning objects, but
comes with its own formal proof-theory (whereas a representation is relative
to some logic, and thus \inherits" the proof-theory from this logic). Thereby
its proof-theory determines, for example, whether in a sequent calculus for
this logic an elimination rule for some object-level quantier must satisfy the
Eigenvariable condition, or how other parts of a sequent are aected by the
elimination rule for some 2 or 3 in some modal logic.
6
Autexier
 
0

1
(' _  )
+
'
+
 
+
(')  )
+
'
 
 
+
(' ^  )
 
'
 
 
 
(:')
+
'
 
 
(:')
 
'
+
 
 
0

1
(' ^  )
+
'
+
 
+
(' _  )
 
'
 
 
 
(')  )
 
'
+
 
 
 
0
(c)
(8x ')
 
('[x=c]
 
(9x ')
+
('[x=c]
+
Æ Æ
0
(c)
(8x ')
+
('[x=c]
+
(9x ')
 
('[x=c]
 
 
0
(2')
 
'
 
(3')
+
'
+
 
0
(2')
+
'
+
(3')
 
'
 
Fig. 2. Uniform notation for signed formulas
A background mechanism to handle the proof-theory of dierent logics
must allow for a uniform handling of soundness and completeness results for
those logics. Such a basis for propositional and rst-order, classical, modal
and intuitionistic logics is provided by indexed formula trees [12] and relies on
polarities of (sub-)formulas and uniform notation [12,4,3].
The starting point for uniform notation is the concept of signed formulas,
which are formulas ' annotated by some positive ('
+
) or negative ('
 
) po-
larity. Intuitively, a signed formula '
+
occurs in the succedent of a sequent,
i.e.   ` ';, and '
 
occurs in the antecedent of a sequent, i.e.  ; ' ` .
The signed formulas can be categorised into dierent classes, according to
their behaviour during the proof search: consider as an example the sequent
` ' _  . The application of the respective sequent decomposition rule leads
to the single sequent ` ';  . All those kinds of signed formulas are said to be
of type . The complete list of signed formulas of this type are given in the
table for  in Fig. 2.
Furthermore, those signed formulas whose decomposition leads to a split
on the sequent proof tree are said to be of type  (cf. Fig. 2). Signed formulas
of type  correspond to instantiation rules, without restrictions to the substi-
tuted terms, while for Æ-type signed formulas the instantiation must respect
the Eigenvariable condition (e.g. (8x ')
+
, which corresponds to ` 8x ').
For modal logic formulas, the decomposition of -type signed formulas does
not aect the other formulas in a sequent (e.g.  ;2' ` ), while the decom-
position of -type signed formulas changes the other parts of the sequent (e.g.
  ` 2';).
In Fig. 2 the rules also indicate how the polarity is inherited to the sub-
formulas of a signed formula. Using these rules, polarities can be assigned
to all sub-formulas of a formula and the polarity of a subexpression indicates
whether this sub-formula will occur in the antecedent or the succedent of a
sequent, if all structural sequent decomposition rules are applied until this
formula. E.g. the signed formula (' )  )
 
corresponds to  ; ' )  ` .
The -rule reduces this signed formula into the signed formulas '
+
and  
 
.
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Fig. 3. Indexed Formula tree
This corresponds to what happens if the)-Left-decomposition rule is applied
on  ; ')  ` , since it results in a split of the proof (indicated by ), and
' occurs in the succedent of the rst premise   ` ';, and  occurs in the
antecedent of the second premise  ;  ` .
Indexed formula trees as introduced in [12] exploit the tree structure of
formulas and annotate each sub-formula according to the reduction rules with
their respective polarity and uniform type. Consider the indexed formula
tree in Fig. 3 of the signed formula ((28x P (x)) ) (9y (P (y) ^ 2P (y))))
+
.
For each sub-formula there is a position a
i
that is either a position constant or
position variable (which are over-lined, like a
1
). A set of properties associated
to each position is listed in the adjacent table: those are the actual sub-
formula (called the label of the position), its polarity, its uniform type (called
primary type), and its secondary type, which is its type inside the parent
formula reduction rule. According to those reduction rules, only sub-formulas
that are related by an -type position may occur together in a nal sequent
(after application of the respective sequent calculus decomposition rules). This
can be illustrated by the sub-formulas 8x P (x) and P (y) that are related by
the position a
0
, or, similarly, the sub-formulas 8x P (x) and 2P (y)). Hence,
from the indexed formula tree we obtain a simple notion of a context for
some subexpression, i.e. those parts of the signed formula tree, that can be
\used" for this subexpression. This is exploited in Sect. 5 to handle contextual
reasoning.
The tree structure of the indexed formula tree induces an ordering among
the positions. A rst-order substitution  instantiates a variable bound on
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some position a of primary type  and induces an additional ordering relati-
onship between the position a and - or Æ-type positions binding variables in
(x). Combined with the original ordering , we obtain a relation . Such a
rst-order substitution is only sound, if  is irreexive.
Furthermore, we can associate to any position a a string of positions, con-
sisting of some of the positions governing a (i.e. smaller wrt. ) and that are
of primary type  or . Such a string is called the modal prex of the posi-
tion a. Which positions are actually used in the prex depends on the modal
logic under consideration (K, K4, S4, etc., cf. [12] for details). The variable
positions are exactly all positions of primary type . Modal substitutions are
used to instantiate the position variables by modal position strings. Depen-
ding on the modal logic under consideration, there is a set of restrictions how
the position variables can be instantiated (cf. [12]). Furthermore, similar to
rst-order substitutions a modal substitution induces an ordering among the
- and -type positions and again the induced overall ordering  must be
irreexive. All the requirements about the instantiation of variables, position
variables, the irreexivity of induced overall orderings  among positions are
subsumed by the uniform notion of L-admissible substitutions, where L is eit-
her classical rst-order logic, or propositional or rst-order modal logic K, K4,
D, D4, T, S4, or propositional or rst-order intuitionistic logic. The uniform
notion of L-admissible substitutions is the key concept allowing for a uniform
treatment of a large class of logics.
Based on these techniques, we introduce the uniform notion of valid proof
states (i.e., a signed formula tree with an irreexive ordering ). From [12]
we obtain, that the application of L-admissible substitutions preserves the
validity of proof states. The problem to compute L-admissible substitutions
can be solved by using a standard unication procedure with occur-check for
object variables, and the generic prex unication procedure from [9], which
computes only L-admissible substitutions for position variables, where L is
any of the above logics. The notion of valid proof states can subsequently be
used to formally prove the L-soundness of any other transformation we might
dene on the signed formula tree. Hence, using signed formula trees gives us
a powerful and uniform mechanism to support a variety of logics inside the
framework.
5 Intuitive and Contextual Reasoning
For the design of reasoning and renement procedures we support an intui-
tive reasoning style. To this end we aim to focus the reasoning process on
arbitrary sub-expressions of some actual expression and to have a strong sup-
port of contextual reasoning inside a focus. Window inference [11,6] has been
introduced as a formalisation of an intuitive and hierarchical reasoning style.
The basic objects are windows
h[] ` P (a)) :(a = b)i
+
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which represents that the focus is on the positive (+) formula P (a)) :(a = b)
(denoted as the content of the window) and the context of this focus is empty
([]). The basic window inference rules are
(i) to focus on some subexpression of the content of a window
h[] ` P (a)) :(a = b)i
+
w
h[a = b] ` P (a)i
 
w
h[a = b] ` ai
Æ
;
where
w
denotes a focus derivation step. Note that this rule must be de-
ned for any logical connective (positive) in the example) and argument
position (rst argument of) in the example), in order to adjust the con-
text in a consistent manner. While this is not diÆcult for classical logics,
where the context of a sub-focus is either equal or an extension of the
previous context, this gets diÆcult as soon as we deal with non-classical
logics.
(ii) to transform the content of a window using information from the context
h[a = b] ` ai
Æ
w
h[a = b] ` bi
Æ
;
(iii) and to leave a focus and return to the parent focus
h[a = b] ` bi
Æ
w
h[a = b] ` P (b)i
 
w
h[] ` P (b)) :(a = b)i
+
:
Furthermore, window inference reasoning also allows one to focus on the con-
dition of a window. To this set of basic rules we added a general rule to allow
one to introduce a case analysis:
h[H] ` ti
p
w
h[A j H] ` ti
p
and h[B j H] ` ti
p
;
In order to ensure the soundness of the case analysis
2
the condition h[H] `
A _Bi
+
is generated as an additional goal. In order to allow for an intui-
tive design of reasoning procedures, we integrated window inference reasoning
with indexed formula trees (cf. Sec. 4) by annotating positions in the indexed
formula trees with windows. As focusing on subexpressions is along the tree
structure, opening a sub-window corresponds to adding a window on the re-
spective position. Similarly, leaving a focus means removing the window from
a position and returning to the previous position.
The integration of indexed formula trees with windows results in the fol-
lowing structure of the framework: inside the framework, proof states are
represented by indexed formula trees with windows. They serve as a sound-
ness backbone managing any proof transformation, like e.g. the instantiation
of variables or the application of rules from the context. The indexed formula
trees are invisible to the reasoning procedures, which communicate with them
via the windows annotated to specic positions and applying window infe-
rence rules, which result in a change of the proof state. An example for this
is the opening of a sub-window, the instantiation of variables, etc. The diÆ-
2
Even for intuitionistic logic.
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culty remains that contextual information must be provided to the reasoning
procedures, like what is the polarity of a window, which are the instantiable
variables, and especially which are possible rules from the context of a window
and whether they are applicable. These diÆculties are elegantly resolved by
using indexed formula trees:
Polarity of windows: The polarity of a window is simply the polarity of the
position it is attached to in the indexed formula tree.
Instantiable Variables: The instantiable variables of some window are sim-
ply all variables that are bounded on some -type position in the formula
tree. In order to check the admissibility of the instantiation of a variable,
we check the L-admissibility of the substitution (i.e. the irreexivity of the
new induced ordering  , cf. Sec. 4).
Sampling contextual rules: The context of a window is uniformly deter-
mined by the position in the indexed formula: all parts of the indexed
formula, that are related to the actual window by an -type position, are in
the logical context. Indeed, according to the reduction rules in Fig. 2, only
-related formulas may occur together in some nal sequent after apply-
ing respective calculus decomposition rules (cf. Sec. 4). Hence, usable rules
to change the content of a window are for example all negative equations
and implications in the context. The application of a negative equation
is basically a paramodulation rule, whereas the application of a negative
implication is a resolution step. The conditions for such a rule are all the
formulas that are -related to this rule. From this we can dene a uniform
concept of a replacement rule ['] u! v: intuitively, this rule means that
we can replace a content u of a window by v, if we prove the conditions '.
This notion can be dened formally as well as if it is admissible wrt. some
focus (i.e. position).
Denition 5.1 [Admissible replacement rules] Let a be a position of la-
bel s and polarity p in some indexed formula tree. Then [] u! v is an
admissible replacement rule for a, if
(i) u and v are either the left- and right-hand side of a negative equation,
that is -related to a, or u and v are -related formulas with the same
modal or intuitionistic prexes, of polarities  p and p respectively, and
-related to a,
(ii) and  contains all other formulas that are -related to u and v. 2
Application of replacement rules: To apply a replacement rule on some
focus, we must syntactically unify the left-hand side of the rule with the
context of the focus as well as their modal prexes. Furthermore, if the
replacement rule is not an equation, the focus and the left-hand side of
the rule must have opposite polarities. For unication we use standard
unication procedures for object level variables and rely on the generic
prex unication procedure from [9], in order to compute only substitutions
that are admissible for the actual logic. This allows to prove for all logics
11
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procedure abstract-prove-reachable
(window:TLA-States&Transitions)
...
endprocedure
refinement abstract-prove-reachable-refine
for abstract-prove-reachable
...
endrefinement
procedure prove-reachable (window:TLA)
call-on-abstraction Reachable-Abstraction window
abstract-prove-reachable
endprocedure
Fig. 4. TLA reasoning and renement procedures
considered in [12] the soundness of the replacement rule application.
In summary, the integration of window inference reasoning with indexed
formulas allows on the one hand for the design of intuitive reasoning proce-
dures. On the other hand it provides a simple but powerful mechanism to
support contextual reasoning.
6 Organising Proof Search
The overall proof search inside the framework is organised by the reasoning and
renement procedures, and some additional language constructs to combine
them. The reasoning procedures are based on windows and interact with the
proof in two manners: rst, the content of a window can be modied by
applying a replacement rule from the context of the window. Second, they
can introduce a case analysis over some arbitrary formulas A
1
_ : : : _ A
n
at
any stage of the reasoning process. Following the intuitive reasoning paradigm,
reasoning procedures can focus the proof search on some sub-window by calling
another reasoning procedure on the sub-window. Finally, they can invoke the
reasoning on some higher reasoning level by calling a reasoning procedure
on some abstraction of the actual window. To this end they indicate the
abstraction to be used and the reasoning procedure of the higher reasoning
level to call. In case the abstract reasoning procedure succeeds, the renement
of the (abstract) proof is achieved by calling the renement procedure of the
abstract reasoning procedure. Only if the renement procedure succeeds, the
proof planning attempt is successful.
Example 6.1 Take as an example a reasoning procedure prove-reachable
that is specialised to prove temporal properties of the form 3' (cf. Fig. 4).
Hence, the argument of the reasoning procedure is declared to be from the
representation TLA. Furthermore let abstract-prove-reachable be the rea-
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soning procedure on the representation TLA-States&Transitions introduced
in Sect. 2, and let Reachable-Abstraction be the abstraction from the repre-
sentation TLA to the representation TLA-States&Transitions. In Fig. 4 we
sketch the body of prove-reachable: this procedures calls the abstract re-
asoning procedure via call-on-abstraction, which abstracts the argument
window to the representation TLA-States&Transitions and calls the abstract
reasoning procedure abstract-prove-reachable. If this procedure succeeds,
the corresponding renement procedure abstract-prove-reachable-refine
is called, which renes the abstract proof on TLA-States&Transitions to a
proof on TLA formulas. 2
7 Conclusion
In this paper we took up the motivation that the task to construct a proof
is an engineering task. This necessitates a methodology to design and apply
proof engineering techniques and we emphasised that the techniques developed
in proof-planning aim at these goals. Based on that we developed a proof-
planning framework, that comes with an explicit notion of dierent reasoning
levels. The reasoning levels can be structured via abstraction and renement
relations. Furthermore, we emphasised that cognitive adequate reasoning is a
key issue for the design of higher reasoning levels. This entails on the one hand,
that the representation of reasoning objects of the dierent reasoning levels
should be intuitive. Subsequently, a uniform mechanism to support directly
soundness wrt. a large variety of logics has been introduced, without having
to alter the representation of logical formulas. Furthermore, we integrated
this mechanism with an extension of the window inference reasoning style to
allow for the design of intuitive reasoning procedures. A major benet of this
integration is a straightforward and elegant support of contextual reasoning,
a key concept for intuitive reasoning. Finally, we sketched how proof-search
engineering methods like reasoning procedures, abstractions and renements
can be dened in the framework, and how these techniques are linked together
and subsequently can be applied for proof-search.
The framework serves as the basis for the ongoing implementation of the
core reasoning mechanisms in the INKA 5.0 system [1]. Future work consists of
nishing the implementation of the framework, and to validate the adequacy of
the framework by implementing reasoning levels and structuring mechanisms
for specic domains and problems. Theoretical future work is concerned with
the integration of further logics into the framework.
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